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1 Introduction
A well-known empirical regularity is that fertility declines with income. Becker (1960), for example,
makes this observation referring to the 1910, 1940 and 1950 Censuses and the Indianapolis survey
for 1900s, a pattern recently conrmed by Jones and Tertilt (2006) using census evidence dating
back to 1826. A negative association is also evident when looking at the cross-country data on
average fertility and per-capita income (e.g., Manuelli and Seshadri, 2009), and has led to the
adage "development is the best contraceptive." Recent development theories that are otherwise well
microfounded assume ad-hoc rules to guarantee consistency with this regularity. Kremer (1993)
and Hansen and Prescott (2002), for example, assume that fertility depends solely on per-capita
consumption and that this relationship is negative for su¢ ciently high consumption. The exact
economic incentives and constraints behind the postulated negative association are left unexplained.
A large literature has sought to explain the evidence on fertility. The most accepted explanation
is the time-cost of children theory according to which the opportunity cost of having children
is higher for high earning individuals (Barro, 1960 and Barro and Lewis, 1973). Such theories
are able to explain the required pattern by including non-labor income and/or non-homothetic
preferences. Preferences in this early tradition are mostly static, what Barro and Becker (1986)
refer to as "agnostic preferences." These preferences have two shortcomings. First, since they lack
solid microfoundations, they are of limited use in evaluating policy alternatives in the context of
modern macroeconomic models. Second, as Jones, Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2008) point out, the
results obtained with these static "agnostic" preferences do not seem to hold under fully dynamic
altruistic preferences, and call for more research in this area.1
Dynamic altruistic models of fertility are at an impasse to get both the time-series and the
cross-sectional features of fertility. A standard fertility choice model with altruistic parents in
the tradition of Barro and Becker (1989) and Becker and Barro (1988) (BB henceforth) predicts
that fertility is independent of wages, but it depends on interest rate. This fertility-interest rate
link is exploited by Manuelli and Seshadri (2009) in explaining cross-country di¤erences in fertility.
Although di¤erences in interest rates may play a role in cross-country comparisons, this mechanism
may not be relevant to explain fertility di¤erences within a country. Di¤erences in wages are a more
plausible explanation. As we analyze in Cordoba and Ripoll (2011), when nancial frictions are
introduced in the BB model, wages become a determinant of fertility. However, obtaining a negative
fertility-income relationship with standard time-separable CRRA preferences requires an elasticity
of intertemporal substitution (EIS) larger than one, EIS > 1. This is problematic for at least
two reasons. First, EIS < 1 is the value supported by ample empirical evidence, and it is the
standard value in quantitative growth and business cycle models. Second, Hall and Jones (1997)
1Depending on their treatment of preferences, macroeconomic papers on fertility can be grouped into three types:
non-altruistic (those in which parents care about either the number of children, or their human capital, but not
directly about the utility of the children), partially altruistic, and altruistic. Examples in the non-altruistic category
include Galor and Weil (1996, 1999, 2000), Greeenwood and Seshadri (2002), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Greenwood,
Seshadri and Vandenbroucke (2005), and Galor (2005, 2011). Partially altruistic preferences are considered in Jones
and Schoonbroodt (2009). Fully altruistic models in the tradition of Becker and Barro (1988) and Barro and Becker
(1989) include Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990), Boldrin and Jones (2002), Doepke (2004, 2005), Manuelli and
Seshadri (2009) and Bar and Leukhina (2010).
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show that EIS < 1 is required to explain the observed positive relationship between income and
demand for longevity. As we discuss below, there is an analogy between longevity and fertility
because altruistic individuals regard their children as an extension of their own life. In sum,
while the positive longevity-income relationship requires a EIS < 1, the negative fertility-income
relationship requires EIS > 1. These results motivate us to look beyond the standard separable
preferences. However, a general theory of altruism beyond the separable BB model has not been
developed. Unless some guidance is provided, arbirtrary non-separable preferences may violate
basic principles of altruism.
This paper derives a general class of altruistic preferences from basic axioms of altruism and
uses the derived framework to study fertility choices. The basic axioms of altruism we formulate
provide discipline to the types of admissible preferences. We view altruism as a natural explanation
for the demand for children. It implies that the parent is the "social planner" at the family level
so that family allocations are not intrinsically ine¢ cient. Moreover, altruism is the basic principle
of the Ramsey model and modern macroeconomics.
The general class of altruistic preferences we derive include the standard time-separable prefer-
ences of BB as a special case, but admit a much richer set of utility representations, including non-
separable functions. To the extent of our knowledge, fertility models with non-separable dynamic
altruistic preferences have not been studied before. In our formulation, the fundamental axiom of
altruism is that the utility of the parents increases with the utility of each one of their "potential"
children. Providing these microfoundations is important in understanding the underlying principles
of demand for children. For instance, we show that the denition of altruism itself requires the
explicit consideration of the utility of unborn children. Most of the fertility literature does not
explicitly consider the utility of children in the unborn state because it is implicitly normalized to
zero. However, in the context of non-separable preferences such normalization is not without loss
of generality, and implies restrictions on the value of the EGS. More importantly, providing care-
ful microfoundations for dynamic altruistic preferences has a broader impact on problems beyond
those of fertility choice. For example, any decision problem in which altruistic individuals must
choose between two alternative states with di¤erent utility values such as giving birth to a child or
not, living or dying, staying married or getting divorced, should satisfy an axiom of indi¤erence.
Specically, if the two alternatives have the same utility value, the individual should be indi¤erent
among them. In this paper we postulate a number of axioms that discipline the class of admissible
preferences consistent with altruism.
We use our non-separable altruistic preferences to study fertility choices in a model with a non-
negative bequest constraint, non-labor income and non-economic goods.2 Our preferences can dis-
entangle the curvature associated to intragenerational consumption from that of intergenerational
consumption choices. That is, they disentangle what we call the "elasticity of intergenerational
substitution" (EGS) from the EIS. This disentangling captures a dimension of intergenerational
consumption allocation that, to the extent of our knowledge, has not been explored before. Stan-
2Bequest constraints are a form of nancial frictions. Cordoba and Ripoll (2011) show that other nancial frictions,
such as borrowing constraints for students, have similar implications.
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dard time-separable preferences implicitly assume that the rate at which the parent substitutes his
own consumption across time is the same rate at which the parent substitutes his own and his
childrens consumption. This does not need to be the case.
The distinction between the EGS and the EIS is key to reconcile the evidence on fertility: on
the one hand, it allows to assume EIS < 1, which is not only standard in quantitative macro, but
also consistent with the positive longevity-income relationship. On the other hand, restrictions on
the value of the EGS can be derived in order to generate a negative fertility-income relationship.
We nd that regardless of the EIS, if EGS > 1 then fertility decreases with income. Since the EGS
is a new concept, no estimates of its value exist, but we consider the fact that fertility decreases
with income as prima facie evidence that EGS > 1 and leave its estimation for future work. The
important point here is that with non-separable preferences it is now feasible to set EIS < 1 in order
to reconcile dynamic altruistic models with the longevity-income relationship, the fertility-income
relationship and the ample empirical evidence EIS < 1 used in quantitative macroeconomics.
The intuition that EGS > 1 is needed to obtain a negative fertility-income relationship is the
following. Suppose wages go to innite and that the EGS < 1. Parents drive their consumption to
innite as part of the optimal plan. Moreover, the low elasticity of substitution between childrens
and parental consumption induces the parent to provide an increasing consumption to their children.
More importantly, providing consumption to a new child becomes increasingly more valuable than
rising consumption of existing family members. For this reason, parents facing a very large wage
would like to have as many children as possible if EGS < 1. On the other hand, if EGS > 1 then
parental consumption can substitute for childrens consumption, and the consumption of newborns
is not particularly valuable relative to the consumption of the parent. In this case, the number of
children does not need to increase with wages and in fact, as we show, decreases with wages in the
presence of non-labor income or non-homothetic preferences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a preamble by sum-
marizing the ndings of dynamic altruistic fertility choice models with standard time-separable
preferences. Section 3 derives the relevant altruistic preferences from rst principles or axioms.
The result of our axiomatic approach is a generalized set of internally consistent altruistic prefer-
ences that can be used to derive the demand for children. We provide specic examples of a variety
of altruistic preferences that can be easily incorporated in dynamic general equilibrium models.
In particular, we consider functions of the CRRA and CARA families, and stress a formulation
that disentangles the EIS, the one that controls consumption smoothing within a generation, from
the EGS, which controls consumption smoothing across generations. Section 4 studies fertility
decisions of altruistic parents within a dynamic set up. Parents face time and non-time costs of
raising children. Bequests are in principle possible, but we focus on cases in which the interest
rate is su¢ ciently low so that the bequest constraint is binding. The resulting set up resembles the
Samuelson-Diamond OLG model but with endogenous dynasties. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
3
2 The separable case
Consider the following fertility choice problem solved by altruistic parents in a life cycle economy. A
parent with life span T chooses a life cycle consumption prole C = [c0; cT ], the number of children
0  n  N , and bequests b0 in order to maximize lifetime utility subject to a present value budget
constraint and a non-negative bequest constraint. The parent is assumed to have all children at
age F . The parental problem is described by the following Bellman equation:
V (b) = max
C=[c0;cT ];0nN;b0

U + (n)V (b0)

(1)
subject to
b+ w
R T
0 e
 rtlt(n)dt+ Y =
R T
0 e
 rtctdt+ n
 
+ e rF b0

(2)
b0  0: (3)
Function U represents the parents personal utility as given by
U =
R T
0 e
 t c
1 
t
1  dt+ U
with  > 0 and U is a constant. This representation of U corresponds to the standard time-
separable CRRA utility, where 1= is the EIS. The only di¤erence here is that we introduce U in
order to ensure U  0. Specically, the presence of U allows to consider the case  > 1, one that is
standard in the growth and business cycle literature. The original BB framework restricts attention
to the case 0 <  < 1, one in which U can be normalized to 0.
Term (n)V (b0) in (1) represents the total utility of the n children, where  is the "degree of
altruism" and function (n) is increasing and concave (i.e., 0(n) > 0 and 00(n) < 0). Concavity
captures diminishing marginal altruism. Term (n) is then the weight the utility of each child
V (b0) has on the parents utility.
Turning now to the present value budget constraint in (2), let the parental lifetime labor supply
be L(n)  R T0 e rtlt(n)dt, where r is the instantaneous interest rate and lt(n) is the labor supplied
at age t. Assume that L0(n) < 0 so that children are costly because they reduce the parents
labor supply. We can then dene the parental lifetime income net of children costs as I(n) 
wL(n) + Y   n, where Y is the present value of non-labor income and  is the non-time costs of
raising each child. Finally, equation (3) corresponds to the non-negative bequest constraint.
As discussed in Cordoba and Ripoll (2011) CR hereafter,the original BB parental problem is a
special case of the one described above. In addition to restricting attention to the case 0 <  < 1, BB
do not require bequests to be non-negative. This has important implications for the determinants
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of fertility. Specically, absent constraint (3) the optimality condition for bequests is given by
c00
c0
=

(n)erF
n
1=
where c00=c0 is the child-to-parent relative initial consumption. In the steady state of the model,
this equation determines optimal fertility n from
(n)
n
= e rF
so fertility is a function of the interest rate, but it is independent of all level variables w, Y , and I. In
sum, in BB fertility is independent of income. This stems from the fact that absent a non-negative
bequest constraint, steady-state fertility is determined by the bequest optimality condition, and
not by the fertility optimality condition.
In contrast, if the non-negative bequest constraint (3) is binding, as we analyze in CR, the
optimality condition for fertility is given by

 @I(n)
@n

 @U

@I(n)
= 0(n)V (b0) (4)
where the left-hand side is the marginal cost and the right-hand side is the marginal benet of
an additional child both measured in personal utils (or composite good). Consider the e¤ects of
wages on the marginal benets and costs. The marginal benet of children increases with wages
because it increases the welfare of children, which raises the welfare of the parent as well. Regarding
the marginal cost, there are two opposing e¤ects: the opportunity cost of foregone labor income
( @I(n)=@n) increases with w for any given number of children, while the marginal utility of income
@U=@I(n) decreases with w. For fertility to be a negative function of income, it must be the case
that in response to higher w the marginal cost increases by more than the marginal benet. This
requires the increase in the opportunity cost of foregone labor income to be strong enough to o¤set
the decrease in the marginal utility of income.
More specically, U in equation (4) corresponds to utility under the optimal consumption path
for given n and b = b0 = 0. In other words, U solves the subproblem
U (I (n)) = max
C=[c0;cT ]
U(C) subject to I(n)  R T0 e rtctdt
which results in
U(I(n)) =

1  I(n)
1  + U
5
where  > 0 collects constants.3 Notice that the marginal utility of income in this case is given
by @U=@I(n) = I(n) , which implies that the smaller the , the smaller the decrease in the
marginal utility of income in response to higher w, and the more likely a negative fertility-income
relationship would hold. Using the denition of I(n) together with the expression for @U=@I(n)
and the stationary value of V (b) we have can write equation (4) as4
  wL0(n) (wL(n) + Y )  = 0(n) 1  (wL(n) + Y )1  + U
1  (n) : (5)
The equation above has a number of implications. First, if Y = U = 0, then fertility is
independent of income. In other words, it is possible to have income as a determinant of fertility
when the non-negative bequest constraint binds, but only in the presence of non-labor income or
utility from non-economic goods U . Second, to develop some more intuition consider the case
U = 0, which would only allow for  < 1. In this case, with Y > 0 an increase in w increases the
marginal benet proportionally less than it increases the marginal cost.5 Thus, fertility declines
with income. Third, consider the case Y = 0, so that we can write (5) as
 L0(n)
L(n)
 (wL(n))1  = 0(n)

1  (wL(n))
1  + U
1  (n)
which implies that U > 0 weakens the e¤ects of higher w on the marginal benet of children.
Specically, if  < 1 an increase in w increases the marginal benet less than it increases the
marginal cost, and thus fertility is a negative function of income. However, if  > 1, the marginal
cost decreases and fertility increases with income. In sum, as we show in CR, provided that either
Y > 0 or U > 0, fertility is a negative function of income only when 0 <  < 1.
The analysis above implies that dynamic altruistic models of fertility with standard CRRA
time-separable preferences, binding non-negative bequest constraints and non-labor income are
able to predict a negative fertility-income relationship only when EIS > 1. This is problematic
because EIS < 1 is the value supported by ample empirical evidence, and it is the standard
value in quantitative growth and business cycle models. Moreover, in Jones and Schoonbroodt
(2010), EIS < 1 is needed to generate the observed time-series decreases in fertility in response
to decreased mortality. In addition, as shown in Hall and Jones (1997), EIS < 1 is required to
3Specically,  is given by:
 =

r   (r   ) =
1  e((r )= r)T
1  
1  e((r )(1 )= )T
  (r   ) (1  ) =

> 0:
4 In deriving this equation we have assumed  = 0; so that the only cost of raising children is in terms of the
parents time. As Jones, Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2008) discuss, this is the most relevant cost in understanding the
fertility-income relationship.
5Notice that Y > 0 makes the increase in the marginal cost larger because the marginal cost (lef-hand-side on
equation 5) involves a term linear in w, the opportunity cost  wL0(n). In addition, the e¤ect on the marginal
utility of income (wL(n) + Y )  is weakend by the presence of Y . Similarly, the increase in the marginal benet
(right-hand-side) through term (wL(n) + Y )1  is weakend by Y .
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explain the increased demand for longevity as income increases in time.
In what follows we propose the introduction of non-separable utility to study models of fertility
choice. In particular, we propose to replace (1) with
V (b) = max
C=[c0;cT ];0nN;b0
G(U(C); V 0(b); n) (6)
where function G is not necessarily linear, and function U(C) is non-separable. One of the ad-
vantages of this general representation is that it allows to disentangle the EIS from what we call
the "elasticity of intergenerational substitution" (EGS). One example of the class of non-separable
preferences G(U; V 0; n) is given by
V =

U1  + (n)V 01 
 1
1  (7)
with
U =
R T
0 e
 tc1 t dt
 1
1 
+ U
where 1= is the EIS, while the EGS is given by 1=. Notice that when U = 0, the separable
representation can be obtained as a special case when  = . As we show below, in our non-separable
framework a negative fertility-income relationship can be generated with a low EIS ( > 1), and a
high EGS ( < 1). In this case, parents prefer atter consumption proles as in standard macro
models ( > 1), but they also have a high degree of substitution between parental and childrens
consumption ( < 1). This implies that in the face of higher income, the consumption of an
additional child is not particularly valuable relative to the consumption of the parent. Under these
circumstances, a negative fertility-income relationship can be obtained with  > 1.
These more general, non-separable altruistic preferences have not been studied before. Next
section we derive these preferences from rst principles by proposing a set of axioms and providing
examples of utility functional forms that satisfy them. It turns out, as we describe in detail below,
that providing these microfoundations for altruistic preferences is important in understanding the
underlying principles of demand for children. Altruism is a natural explanation for the demand for
children and it imposes a tight discipline on the set of admissible preferences. More importantly,
altruism is the basic principle of the Ramsey model and modern macroeconomics. It implies that
the parent is the "social planner" at the family level so that family allocations are not intrinsically
ine¢ cient.
3 The altruistic welfare function
In this section we postulate a set of axioms describing preferences of altruistic parents and derive
certain restrictions and properties implied by these axioms. We also provide examples of preferences
that satisfy the axioms and examples of preferences, some of which are used in the literature, that
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do not.
3.1 The altruistic approach
Consider a continuous time dynastic set up in which individuals derive utility from their private
consumption and from the utility of their N potential children. Among the potential children, only
n are born where 0  n  N . Potential children are ordered according to their "potential" birth
ordering, from 1 to N . The birth ordering is "potential" because children may or may not be born.
Assume that parental utility, V , can be written in terms of a private utility index associated to his
own consumption, U , and the utility of his N potential children, V 1 to V N , as follows:
V = bG(U; V 1; V 2; ::; V N ): (8)
This formulation is similar to the one used by Koopmans (1960), Lucas and Stokey (1983),
Dolmas (1996), Becker and Boyd (1997), Ben-Gad (1998), Backus, Routledge, and Zin (2004), and
Farmer and Lahiri (2005), but with three important di¤erences. First, U is an utility index, or com-
posite consumption good, associated to the lifetime consumption sequence of the parent, not just
the consumption of one period. Second, the formulation above allows for multiple potential descen-
dants N instead of just one. Third, we study the endogenous determination of born descendants
n. In what follow we use the terms born descendants, children and o¤springs interchangeably.
Function (8) is altruistic because the parent cares about the welfare of his descendants. It may
not be immediately intuitive why the welfare function should specify the utility of all potential
children, even if they are unborn. The following example seeks to motivate this important point.
Example 1 Suppose N = 1 and bG is increasing in its two arguments. Let V 1 = V 0 be the utility of
the descendant if born and V 1 = D if unborn. Similarly, let U0 and U1 be the personal utility
associated to having zero or one child respectively. Suppose U0 > U1 meaning that the child
is costly to the parent in terms of personal utility. The child is born if bG(U1; V 0) > bG(U0; D)
which requires V 0 > D.
The previous example makes clear that altruistic models need to specify the utility of the child
in the unborn state, D. Since the parent cares about another individual, his child, the utility of that
individual if unborn is relevant for fertility decision of the parent. Most of the fertility literature
does not explicitly consider the utility of the unborn either because it is implicitly normalized to
zero, or because the underlying preferences are not truly altruistic.6 The welfare of the unborn
is also explicitly considered in models of optimal population size. For example, the question of
optimal population size requires the concept of "potential people" and their welfare in the born
and unborn states (see Golosov, Jones and Tertilt, 2007). Appendix A develops an alternative
motivation for D by considering the equivalence between children and longevity.
6An exception is Jones and Schoonbroot (2009). See Example 7 below for a discussion.
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The utility function (8) resembles the Dixit and Stiglitzs (1977) preferences for varieties. In their
formulation U is the consumption of a numeraire good while (V 1; V 2; ::; V N ) are the consumptions
of a range of "potential" goods. Moreover, some goods are not consumed in equilibrium meaning
that for those goods V i = 0. In our framework, parental utility depends on the utility of the N
"potential" children some of whom are not born, meaning that V i = D for those children. In
the Dixit-Stiglitzs preferences individuals derive utility from a "variety" of potential consumption
goods, while in our preferences parents derive utility from a "variety" of potential children.
Function bG is an aggregator. A simplication arises when all born children receive the same
utility, say V 0, and all unborn children receive the same utility, D. This situation could arise due
to properties of the preferences or to underlying technological or social constraints.7 This is the
case stressed in the literature and the one we focus in most of the paper. In this case (8) simplies
to
V = G(U; V 0; D; n)  bG(U;V0n;DN n); (9)
where V0n = V 0 
 !
1 n and DN n = D  !1 N n; with  !1 m a m dimensional row vector of ones.
We now postulate some desirable properties for bG in the form of axioms, and use corollaries
to translate those axioms into implied properties for the function G. Of particular importance is
to characterize the derivative of G with respect to n, key in determining fertility choices. Notice
that n does not enter directly as an argument in the primitive function bG but enters indirectly in
function G because it divides the set of potential children into two groups, born and unborn, which
in turn enjoy di¤erent utility levels.
It is natural to restrict the number of children to be a discrete variable. On the other hand, it
is convenient to assume that the number of children is a continuous variable so that simple calculus
can be used to characterize fertility decisions. With these considerations in mind, we state the
axioms characterizing bG for a discrete number of children but state the implied properties of G for
a continuous number of potential children taking values in the interval [0; N ].
3.2 Basic axioms of altruism
Let UF  V F be the set of feasible utilities U and V . Assume that bG is di¤erentiable as needed in
the feasible set and that unborn children all receive the same utility, D 2 V F . Denote the partial
derivatives of bG as bGU  @ bG=@U and bGi  @ bG=@V i for i = 1; :::; N:8 A natural property is bGU > 0
which is assumed to hold. Similarly, denote GU  @G=@U , GV  @G=@V 0, and GD  @G=@D. A
key concept is the increase in parental utility derived from one more o¤spring. It can be dened
as G(U; V 0; D; n+1) G(U; V 0; D; n). When n is allowed to be a continuos variable, the analogous
concept is that of the marginal utility of o¤springs dened as Gn(U; V 0; D; n)  @G(U; V 0; D; n)=@n:
The following corollary establishes basic restrictions on GU , GV , GD and Gn that follow directly
from the denition of G given by (9).
7For example, parents may equalize utilities across children to avoid conicts among them.
8For a continuous number of children, bGi is dened for i 2 [0; N ] and the rst child is child "0".
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Corollary 1 GU = bGU > 0; GV = R n0 bGi(U;V0n;DN n)di; GD = R Nn bGi(U;V0n;DN n)di and
Gn(U; V
0; D; n)  bGn(U;V0n;DN n)(V 0  D) (10)
The last part of Corollary 1 is the rst order Taylor approximation of G(U; V 0; D; n + 1)  
G(U; V 0; D; n) = bG(U;V0n+1;DN n 1)   bG(U;V0n;DN n). Equation (10) states that the marginal
utility (to the parent) of having o¤spring n is the additional utility to the child from being born,
V 0  D; times the marginal e¤ect of that utility into the parents utility, bGn:
The following Axiom denes bG as a pure aggregator of parents and childrens utilities.
Axiom 1 - Identity. bG(U; ::) = U if N = 0.
Corollary 2. G(U) = U if N = 0:
In words, Axiom 1 states that the utility of a parent with no potential children is just U . In that
case, G is just the identity function. The next axiom denes altruism: parental utility is strictly
increasing in its last N arguments.
Axiom 2 - Altruism. bGi > 0 for all i 2 f1; ::; Ng.
Corollary 3. Let Axiom 2 hold. Then GV > 0 and GD > 0:
The following proposition, and its corollary, states a simple but key result that can be used to
check whether preferences are altruistic or not.
Proposition 1 - O¤spring are goods. Let Axiom 2 hold. O¤springs are goods (for the parents)
if and only if V i > D for all i  n:
Proof. O¤spring i is a good if, everything else equal, parental utility increases by having child i;
or bG(U; V 1; :::; V i; :::; V n; D;D; :;D)  bG(U; V 1; :::; D; :::; V n; D;D; :;D) > 0
for all i  n: By Axiom 2, this inequality holds if and only if V i > D.
Corollary 4. Let Axiom 2 hold. Then Gn(U; V 0; D; n) > 0 (o¤springs are goods) if and only if
V 0 > D and Gn(U; V 0; D; n) = 0 (indi¤erence) if and only if V 0 = D:
As we show below when we present a series of examples, some of the altruistic preferences that
have been used in the literature do not satisfy Axiom 2, so they are not consistent with Proposition
1 and Corollary 4 (see Examples 8 and 9).
The degree of altruism toward potential child i is described by bGi and the overall degree of
altruism by
PN
i=1
bGi:When V 0i = V 0 for all o¤spring, the overall degree of altruism toward o¤spring
is described by GV . In order to have well-behaved fertility and bequest decisions, some restrictions
are needed for both. A property commonly required in the literature is that of diminishing altruism
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or child discounting. It states that the marginal utility to the parent from additional o¤springs
decreases with the number of o¤springs. This property is analogous to time discounting in dynamic
models but applied to the number of children rather than the number of periods. The following is
a formal denition of diminishing altruism.
Axiom 3 - Diminishing altruism or child discounting. bGi(U;V0n;DN n) strictly decreases
with i for all i  n and all feasible n. Moreover, bGn(U;V0n;DN n) decreases with n for
all n  N .
Corollary 5. Let Axiom 3 hold. Then Gn(U; V 0; D; n) decreases with n.
It is convenient to impose more structure to the rate at which altruism diminishes. The following
axiom postulates a strong form of diminishing altruism used in the literature. It states that altruism
decreases at a rate that only depends on the birth order but not on U , V , D or n.
Axiom 3a - Child discount factor. Let '(i) be a positive strictly decreasing function satisfying
'(1) = 1. Then, bGi(U;V0n;DN n) = bG1(U;V01;DN 1)'(i) for all i  n and all feasible n.
To further understand Axiom 3a, notice that '(i) = bGi(U;V0n;DN n)= bG1(U;V01;DN 1) is the
"weight" of o¤spring i in a family with n children relative to that of o¤spring 1 in a family with
one child. In principle, '(i) could depend on i, U , V , D and n; but Axiom 3a states that it
only depends on i; the birth order. Variables such as family size or consumption do not a¤ect
this relative weight. This assumption is analogous to the assumption of standard dynastic models
according to which the rate of time preference depends only on the time of consumption but not
on other characteristics such as life span or consumption level.
Consider next some implications for G: Notice that Axiom 3a and equation (10) imply that
Gn(U; V
0; D; n) = G0(U; V 0; D; 0)'(n); which again assumes that n is a continuos variable in the
interval [0; N ]. Dene (n)  R n0 '(i)di to be the total weight of the n o¤springs relative to the
rst o¤spring.
Corollary 6. Let Axiom 3a hold for n 2 [0; N ]. Then Gn(U; V 0; D; n) = G0(U; V 0; D; 0)'(n);
where '(n) is a positive strictly decreasing function satisfying '(0) = 1 for 0  n  N .
Moreover, GV (U; V 0; D; n) = bG0(U;V00;DN )(n):
The last part of Corollary 6 uses Corollary 1. Examples of two possible functional forms for '(n)
are exponential and hyperbolic. Exponential child discounting takes the form '(i) = e i,  > 0;
and implies (n) = (1  e n) =: This type of discounting is the natural counterpart of exponential
time discounting of dynastic models. It has the convenient property that (1) = 1= <1 which
helps to keep the parental utility bounded for any number of potential children.
Hyperbolic child discounting takes the form '(i) = i , 0 <  < 1, and implies (n) =
n1 = (1  ) : The restriction 0 <  is required for altruism to be decreasing and  < 1 is required
for GV (U; V 0; D; n) > 0 (see Corollary 6). Hyperbolic discounting is the more standard assumption
in the fertility literature following the original BB formulation. Although it is convenient in some
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cases, as it allows simple aggregation, it may also be problematic. In particular, '(0) = 1 which
violates one of the properties in Corollary 6 meaning that altruism is not strictly decreasing. A
practical implication of this feature is that hyperbolic discounting forces an interior solution of
fertility choices which may not be desirable given that many individuals choose not to have children.
While marginal altruism, bGi, is relevant for fertility decisions, average altruism is relevant for
bequests decisions. Average altruism is dened as:
(n;U; V 0; D)  GV (U; V 0; D; n)=n: (11)
Thus, while GV (U; V 0; D; n) is the total increase in parental utility due to one more util for each
o¤spring, (n;U; V 0; D) is the increase in parental utility per-o¤spring. It is natural to require that
(n;U; V 0; D) weakly decreases with n so that larger families do not exhibit stronger incentives
to leave larger bequests per o¤spring. The following proposition states that average altruism is
decreasing under Axiom 3a.
Proposition 2. Let Axiom 3a hold for n 2 [0; N ]: Then (n;U; V 0; D) decreases with n.
Proof. Equation (11) and Corollary 6 imply that (n;U; V 0; D) = bG0(U;V00;DN )(n)=n. Func-
tion (n) is strictly concave because '(i) is strictly decreasing. Therefore, (n)=n decreases
with n.
3.3 Stationarity
We now consider additional assumptions to guarantee that utilities are bounded and unique sta-
tionary solutions exist. For this purpose, we focus on the symmetric case described by (9). A
stationary solution of (9) satises, for any feasible U , n and D:
V  = G(U; V ; D; n): (12)
This equation characterizes a stationary solution in which all generations have the same number of
o¤springs and attain the same lifetime utility. A desirable property of this solution would be that
V  > D so that born children are goods.
At this stage it is convenient, but not essential, to restrict the space of utility values to be in
the positive real line. This is largely without loss of generality because utility functions, such as
the CRRA or the CARA, that may take negative values, can be transformed into non-negative
functions using monotonic transformations (see Examples 3 to 7 and the discussion there).
Axiom 4 - Positive utilities. (U; V;D) 2 R+
Given Axiom 4, it is natural to assume the normalization bG(0; 0; :::; 0) = 0: This normalization
pins down the intercept of function G by stating that parental utility only arises from personal
utility or descendants utility, but no from other source.
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Axiom 5 - Normalization. bG(0; 0; :::; 0) = 0.
Corollary 7. G(0; 0; 0; n) = 0 for all 0  n  N:
The following assumption guarantees the existence and uniqueness of a stationary solution for
the mapping (12):
Axiom 6 - Stationarity. G(U; 0; D; n) > 0, GV V  0 and limX!1G(U;X;D; n) < X for any
U > 0, 0  n  N and D  0.
In words, Axiom 6 states that children are not essential and that there is enough discounting. In
particular, G(U; 0; D; n) > 0 means that if the utility of all born children is zero, the parents utility
is still positive, so that children are not essential. The assumption that limX!1G(U;X;D; n) < X
implies that even as born childrens utility goes to innity, parents discount is enough so that
their own utility does not increase as fast. Graphically, limX!1G(U;X;D; n) < X implies that
on a two-dimensional space that maps X into V (see Figure 1), function G eventually crosses
the 45-degree line to allow for the stationary solution V  = G(U; V ; D; n) to exist. Notice that
G(U; 0; D; n) > 0 implies that G crosses the 45-degree line from above. Finally, concavity in V , as
implied by GV V  0, guarantees that the stationary solution is unique.
3.4 Welfare of the unborn
D can be regarded, in general, as an exogenous parameter. However, a case can be made for D
to be derived endogenously in any altruistic framework. A related concept in the social choice
literature is that of a "neutral life," a level of utility such that a life is worth living if well-being is
above neutrality and is not worth living if well-being is below neutrality (Blackorby, Bossert and
Donaldson 2005, p. 25); or that of a "neutral level of wellbeing" a level such that "her living at that
level is equally as good as her nonexistence" (Broome, 2004, p. 188). Such value is often normalized
to zero in the social choice literature. A similar normalization is also implicit in altruistic models
in the BB tradition.
Denote D the endogenously determined value of D. Consider the following formalization for
D. If U collects the utility ow of an individual while alive and eU is "a neutral" ow of utility for
which there is no enjoyment nor pain, then D can be dened as the present value of such utility
ow:
D = G(eU;D; D; n): (13)
The solution forD described by (13) could in principle depend on n but Axiom 3 avoids this depen-
dence. Remember that U denotes the personal utility associated to a path of of zero consumption.
In principle eU 6= U: For example, eU > U means that certain minimum private consumption (ct > 0)
is required for neutrality. On the other hand, eU < U means that there is enjoyment in life beyond
costly consumption due to, say, the existence of non-economic goods (friendship, public goods,
etc.). The following assumption guarantees that D dened by equation (13) exists and is unique.
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Axiom 7 - Value of the unborn child. @G(
eU;0;0;0)
@X < 1, G(
eU;X;X; 0) is concave in X, and
limX!1G(eU;X;X; 0) < X.
Corollary 8. D = 0 if eU = 0 and @D=@ eU > 0 under Axioms 6 and 7.
The interpretation of Axiom 7 is similar to Axiom 6. Figure 1 also portrays the determination
of D. It naturally follows from the Axioms above that V  > D if U  eU . To see this, notice
that G(eU; 0; 0; n) < G(U; 0; D; n) for any feasible U so that the intercept of function G(eU;X;X; n)
lies below that of function G(U;X;D; n). It is not immediately clear which of the two functions
cuts the 45-degree line rst. It turn out the G(eU;X;X; n) does. To see why, consider function
G(eU;X;D; n), which is a parallel shift down of function G(U;X;D; n). By denition, function
G(eU;X;D; n) crosses the 45-degree line at the stationary solution D, i.e., D = G(eU;D; D; n).
Thus, it must be the case that G(eU;X;X; n) = G(eU;X;D; n) at the stationary solution D as
shown in Figure 1. This result is summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 - V  > D: Let Axioms 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 hold and U > eU . Then V  > D:
Corollary 9. Let V 0 = V  and D = D. Then o¤springs are normal goods if and only if U > eU .
These last results are important because, in general, V 0 is endogenous. To guarantee that o¤-
spring are normal goods requires some underlying restrictions. If the axioms required by Proposition
3 hold then o¤springs are normal goods around stationary solutions.
3.5 Marginal rates of substitution
We now study the separate role of U and G in determining three marginal rates of substitution
(MRS): (i) the willingness to substitute consumption across time for the same individual; (ii) the
willingness to substitute consumption across individuals, the parent and his children; and (iii) the
willingness to substitute personal welfare for additional o¤springs. To dene these rates properly,
notice that V can be written solely in terms of utility ows, U , and number of children, n, by
recursively substituting V 0 into equation (9) as:
V = G(U;G(U 0; :::); D; n) (14)
3.5.1 Intertemporal and intergenerational substitution of consumption
Consider rst the marginal rate of substitution between cv and cs; MRS(cs; cv), where cv and cs
are parental consumptions at ages v and s respectively. Since only U depends on cv and cs; by
denition, then the MRS(cv; cs) is given by
MRS (cv; cs) =
@U=@cv
@U=@cs
:
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Consider next the marginal rate of substitution between cv and c0s; MRS (cv; c0s), where c0s is
the age-s consumption of the o¤spring. Since cv only a¤ects U while c0s only a¤ects U 0, then
MRS (cv; c
0
s) is given by
MRS
 
cv; c
0
s

=
@V=@cv
@V=@c0s
=
GU (U; :::) @U=@cv
GV (U; ::)GU (U 0; ::) @U 0=@c0s
: (15)
These marginal rates of substitution can be used to compute elasticities of intertemporal and
intergenerational substitution. The EIS is dened as
EIS (cv; cs) =
d ln(cs=cv)
d lnMRS(cv; cs)
; (16)
while the EGS can be dened as
EGS
 
cv; c
0
s

=
d ln(c0s=cv)
d ln(MRS (cv; c0s))
: (17)
The EIS describes the willingness to substitute consumption intertemporally for the same indi-
vidual, the parent, while the EGS refers to the willingness to substitute consumption across parents
and their children. It is immediate from these denitions that the EIS and the EGS are di¤erent
in general. While the EIS is fully determined by function U , the EGS is determined by U and G.
Therefore, our framework allows to disentangle intertemporal parameters from intergenerational
parameters which are typically assumed to be identical. It is also useful to dene semi-elasticities,
which characterize preferences of the CARA type, as follow:
SEIS (cv; cs) =
d(cs   cv)
d lnMRS(cv; cs)
; and SEGS
 
cv; c
0
s

=
d(c0s   cv)
d ln(MRS (cv; c0s))
:
3.5.2 Marginal rate of substitution between o¤springs and consumption
The optimal fertility decision requires to equalize a marginal rate of substitution to a marginal rate
of transformation. The willingness to substitute personal welfare for an o¤spring, or marginal rate
of substitution between U and n, is the relevant margin. This margin is fully determined by the
function G and it is given by
MRSn;U (U; V;D; n) = Gn=GU : (18)
3.6 Examples
This section presents examples of functions U and G satisfying Axioms 1 to 7, and next section
derives optimal fertility decision for some these examples. The examples assume a continuous
number of children in the interval [0; N ] and are written in terms of a generic weighting function
(n)  R n0 '(i)di, but we discuss specic implications of exponential and hyperbolic weighting.
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Results are also presented for D exogenous and D = D. For each case we derive the marginal rate
of substitution between composite consumption, U , and o¤springs, MRSn;U , the average rate of
altruism, (n;U; V;D), and the elasticities or semi-elasticities of intertemporal and intergenerational
substitution.
The rst example, Example 2, is the traditional time-separable CRRA preferences including
constants U  0 and eU  0. Example 3 generalizes Example 2 to non-separable CRRA preferences.
The separable and non-separable cases di¤er in two important aspects. First, the separable case
imposes the restriction EIS = EGS, while the non-separable case allows EIS 6= EGS. Second,
both preferences can accommodate the case EIS > 1 but the separable preferences require non-
economic goods (U > 0) and restrict the consumption space while the non-separable case does not
require such restrictions. These di¤erences give rise to di¤erent implications for fertility decisions,
as shown in Section 4. Overall, Example 3 is likely the most important for future quantitative work
as it o¤ers CRRA preferences suitable to study fertility issues without imposing restrictions on the
EIS, the EGS or the consumption space.
Example 4 corresponds to non-separable CARA preferences that disentangle semi-elasticities of
intertemporal and intergenerational substitution, SEIS and SEGS. Example 5 combines CARA
preferences for U with CRRA preferences for G, and Example 6 combines CRRA preferences for
U with CARA preferences for G. As it will be shown below in Section 4, the case of CARA
preferences is interesting because it allows to obtain a negative fertility-income relationship even
with zero non-labor income Y = 0 and U = 0. This contrasts with the non-separable CRRA case.
Finally, examples 7, 8 and 9 illustrates preferences that do not satisfy some of the axioms
formulated above. Example 7 shows a type of CARA preferences that violates Axiom 1 (Identity).
Examples 8 and 9 are two cases found in the literature of seemingly altruistic preferences that
violate the basic axiom of Altruism (Axiom 2). Proofs of results in the examples are presented in
Appendix B.
Example 2: Separable CRRA (SCRRA). Let
U =
R T
0 e
 t c
1 
t
1  dt+ U; (19)
and
G(U; V 0; D; n) = U + (n)V 0 +  ((N)  (n))D; (20)
where 0  (N) < 1,  > 0,  6= 1, and ct  c (U) 
h
1 e T
( 1)U
i 1
 1
if  > 1. Some
properties of SCRRA preferences are:
MRSn;U (U; V
0; D; n) = 0(n) (V 0  D)
(U; V;D; n) = (n) = (n)=n
EIS (cv; cs) = EGS (cv; c
0
s) = 1=:
The stationary values of D and V  are given by:
D = fU= (1  (N))
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V  = 1 (N)+((N) (n))(
eU=U)
(1 (n))(1 (N)) U:
Example 2 corresponds to a generalization of equation (1) in Section 2, where the value of unborn
childrenD is explicitly included. Notice that the formulation of G(U; V 0; D; n) in Example 2 satises
the basic axiom of altruism (Axiom 2), and it also satises indi¤erence when V 0 = D (Collorary 4).
The restriction on (N) is required to guarantee the existence of a stationary solution. Parameter
 determines the degree of altruism towards all descendants. For the exponential discounting case,
(N)  = so that a su¢ cient condition for stationarity is  < . For the hyperbolic discounting
case, (1) = 1 so that the restriction is only satised if N is restricted. The second restriction,
ct  c (U), is needed to guarantee positive utility when  > 1. This condition is not satised
unless U > 0, and the larger the U the less stringent the restriction is. Notice also that U is not a
minimum but a maximum utility ow when  > 1. The minimum utility ow is 0 and it is obtained
when ct = c (U).
A notable property of SCRRA preferences in Example 2 is that the EIS is the same as the EGS.
This is the standard specication that has been used in dynamic altruistic models of fertility. Our
next example, Example 3, deviates from this standard by decoupling the EGS from the EIS. It is
a generalization of equation (7) in Section 2, where the value of unborn children D is explicitly
included.
Example 3: Non-separable CRRA (NCRRA). Let
U =
R T
0 e
 tc1 t dt
 1
1 
+ U; (21)
and
G(U; V 0; D; n) =

U1  + 

(n)V 01  + ((N)  (n))D1 	 11  (22)
where   0,  6= 1, 0  (N) < 1, and   0 if D > 0 or 1 >   0 if D = 0. Some
properties of NCRAA preferences are:
MRSn;U (U; V
0; D; n) = 0(n)U [(V 0=U)1    (D=U)1 ]=(1  )
(U; V 0; D; n) = (n) (V=V 0) =n
EIS (cv; cs) = 1=
EIGS (cv; c
0
s) = 1= if U = 0 and approximately equal to 1= if U=U is close to zero.
The stationary values of D and V  are given by:
D = eU= [1  (N)] 11 
V  = U
h
(1 (N))+((N) (n))(eU=U)1 
(1 (n))(1 (N))
i 1
1 
:
Several comments regarding Example 3 are in order. First, notice that U is a CES function
with elasticity 1= while G is CES function with elasticity 1=. The restrictions   0 and   0
are required for concavity. Second, Example 2 can be obtained as a special case of Example 3 when
 =  and U = 0. In this case EIS = EGS, which is restrictive to the extent that individuals
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willingness to substitute consumption intertemporally and intergenerationally may di¤er. Such
distinction may be relevant not only for quantitative work but also for qualitative reasons. Third,
notice that contrary to the separable case, U is positive for any value of   0 and any U  0,
a key advantage of the non-separable CRRA. In other words, it is possible to set U = 0 and still
have a well-dened problem for any . Fourth, restriction 1 >   0 if D = 0 is required to satisfy
Axiom 1. The reason is that descendants become essential goods when  > 1, and, as a result,
V = 0 when D = 0 regardless of the values of U and V 0. This implies that when preferences are
non-separable, normalizing D = 0 is not without loss of generality, as it implies restricting the EGS
to be larger than one. Accommodating EGS < 1 requires D > 0.
We now turn to analyze examples in the class of CARA utility functions. These examples
illustrate the exibility of the framework we propose to accommodate a number of functional forms
that satisfy the axioms of altruism.
Example 4: Non-separable CARA (NCARA). Let
U =   1
U
ln


1  e T
R T
0 e
 te uctdt

+ U (23)
and
G(U; V 0; D; n) =   1
G
ln
8<:e
 GU + 
h
(n)e GV 0 + ((N)  (n)) e GD
i
1 + (N)
9=; ; (24)
where U  0 and G  0. Some properties of NCARA preferences are:
MRSn;U (U; V
0; D; n) = 0(n)eGU

e GD   e GV 0

=G
(U; V 0; D; n) = 1n
(n)e G(V
0 V )
1+(N)
SEIS (cv; cs) = 1=U
SEGS (cv; cs) = 1=G
The stationary values of D and V  are given by:
D = eU
e GV  = e
 GU+(((N) (n)))e G eU
1+((N) (n)) :
Regarding Example 4, notice that the restrictions on U and G are required for strict concavity.
While Example 4 uses non-separable CARA representations for both U and G, the following to
examples combine CARA and CRRA representations for U and G.
Example 5: NCARA-NCRRA. Let U be given by (23) and G by (22) where U  0 and
  0 if D > 0 or 1 >   0 if D = 0: This CARA-CRRA specication satises
SEIS (cv; cs) = 1=U while other features such as ; MRSn;U , V , and D; are those of
the NCRRA specication. Finally, EGS ' 1= for large consumptions.
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Example 5 carries interesting implications for fertility choices. As we show below, with a CARA
representation for U , some of the features needed to generate a negative fertility-income relationship
under Example 3, such as positive non-labor income (Y > 0) or positive zero-consumption utility
(U > 0) are not necessary under Example 5.
Example 6: NCRRA-NCARA. Let U be given by (21) and G be given by (24) where G  0
and   0: This CRRA-CARA specication satises EIS (cv; cs) = 1= while other fea-
tures such , MRSn;U , V , and D; as are those of the GCARA specication. Finally,
SEGS (cv; cs) ' 1=G for large cv and cs.
A variety of other examples can be constructed using monotonic transformations of the utility
functions.9 For instance, (21) is a monotonic transformation of (19) or (23) is a monotonic transfor-
mation of   1u
R T
0 e
 te uctdt, the standard time-separable CARA. However, arbitrary monotonic
transformations do not, in general, satisfy some of the basic axioms of altruism, particularly the
axiom of Identity (Axiom 1). The following CARA example fails to satisfy Axiom 1, but satises
the other axioms.
Example 7: Alternative non-separable CARA. Let
U =
1
U

1  e T   R T0 e te U ctdt+ U
and
G(U; V 0; D; n) =
 
U (U   U) + 1  e T
 G=U    UU + 1  e T  G=U
+

(n)V 0 + ((N)  (n))D ;
where U  0 and G  0. The restrictions on U and G are required for strict concavity.
Notice in particular that, as required, U of a path of zero consumption is U and G(0; 0; 0; n) =
0: Furthermore, SEIS (cv; cs) = 1=U ; SEGS (cv; cs) = 1=G: However, G(U; V
0; D; 0) for
N = 0 is di¤erent from U .
The following two examples illustrate the importance of establishing a set of axioms in deriving
the appropriate altruistic preferences to study fertility choice problems. Each example violates at
least one of the basic axioms of altruism proposed above.
Example 8: Jones and Schoonbroodt (2009). Jones and Schoonbroodt (2009) consider pref-
erences of form:
V = u(ct) + n

tV
0 + (N   nt)D: (25)
9Monotonic transfomations preverse ordinal rankings. Standard results in macro typically depend only on the
ordinal properties of utility functions and therefore are preserved under monotonic transformations. Results that rely
on cardinal properties of utility functions may or may not be preserved.
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If preferences are altruistic, all what should be required for o¤springs to be goods, i.e. for
@V=@n > 0, is that V 0 > D (Corollary 4). However, this is not the case with (25). In
this case @V=@n > 0 requires the more complicated condition n 1t V 0 > (N   nt) 1D. In
addition, (25) violates the indi¤erence result stated in Corollary 4 according to which the
parent must be indi¤erent between any feasible n when V 0 = D. An alternative formulation
of (25) that satises altruism is V = u(ct)+ntV
0+
 
N    nt

D which is a version of Example
2.
Next, Example 9 illustrates the complications that emerge when writing down altruistic prefer-
ences for a fertility choice problem in which survival and death are potential states to be considered.
Example 9: Birchenall and Soares (2009). Birchenall and Soares (2009) consider preferences
of the form:10
V = pa
h
u(ct) + (nt)
 V 0
i
+ (1  pa)M
where  is the fraction of o¤springs that survive, pa is the adult survival probability and M
is the value of death. To see the complications that emerge in this type of set up, suppose
V 0 =M: In this case parents should be indi¤erent between any  because o¤springs receive the
same utility regardless of whether they survive or die. This is not the case in the specication
above.
Example 9 features values for three possible states: the value of being alive V , the value of
death M , and the value of the unborn child D. A specication consistent with the spirit of the
axioms proposed in this section should make altruistic parents indi¤erent between any number of
children n if V 0 = D, and indi¤erent between any child survival probability  if V 0 = M . This
example highlights the importance of well microfounded preferences.
4 Optimal fertility with non-separability
In this section we revisit the fertility choice problem of Section 2, but we now consider non-separable
rather than separable preferences. Recall the problem represents a parent with life span T choosing
a life cycle consumption prole C = [c0; cT ], the number of children 0  n  N , and bequests b0 in
order to maximize lifetime utility subject to a present value budget constraint and a non-negative
bequest constraint. The parent is assumed to have all children at age F . To focus on the fertility
decision, we assume that the interest rate is su¢ ciently low to induce the bequest constraint to
bind along the steady state. The resulting model resembles the Samuelson-Diamond OLG economy
because bequests are absent but it di¤ers in that fertility and dynasty size are endogenous. The
key issue we study in this section is the ability of altruistic models with non-separable preferences
to generate a negative fertility-income relationship.
10We consider a simpler case in which the emotional cost of lossing a child to zero (Mc = 0) and assume that a
constant fraction of o¤springs die.
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The parental problem is described by the Bellman equation:
V (b) = max
0nN; b00; C=[c0;cT ]
G(U(C); V (b0); D; n) (26)
subject to (2) and (3), where function G satises the basic axioms of altruism from Section 3.
The following assumption bounds the stationary average degree of altruism, (n), and thus
guarantees that the bequest constraint is binding in steady state.
Assumption 1. (0)erF  1.
To gain some intuition about Assumption 1, suppose that G is such that (0) = e F so that a
parent with no o¤springs discounts the welfare of her rst dn o¤springs only by their time of birth
using the parents own time discount rate. In this case Assumption 1 becomes e ( r)F  1 or
r   which is a standard assumption for bequest constraints to bind. If the interest rate is below
the rate of time preference, individuals would like to borrow rather than save or give bequests.
The condition (0) = e F is obtained, for example, by setting  = e F in the CRRA cases (see
Examples 2, 3 and 5) or =(1 + (N)) = e F in the CARA cases (see Examples 4 and 6).
Lemma 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then the bequest constraint is binding in the steady state.
Proof. Consider a marginal reallocation of consumption from the parent to his n children. The
parent reduces his age-0 consumption c0 in one unit and, in exchange, increases the age-0
consumption of each of his n children c00 in the amount erF =n. This reallocation can be
obtained by adjusting bequests. The optimality condition for bequests therefore must satisfy
the condition @V=@c0 
 
erF =n
 @V=@c00, with equality if b0 > 0. In the steady state,
@V=@c0
@V=@c00
=
@V=@U  @U=@c0
(n) @V=@V 0  @V 0=@U 0  @U 0=@c00
=
1
n(n)
which implies that the bequest constraint is binding if 1 > (n)erF . If (n) is strictly
decreasing in n then a su¢ cient condition for the bequest constraint to bind for any n is
1  (0)erF .
Given Assumption 1, we can now focus in the steady state situation b = b0 = 0. Recall from
the discussion in Section 2 that it is convenient to solve the remaining problem in two steps. First,
nd the optimal consumption path given n; and second, solve for n. In absence of bequests and for
given n, the optimal consumption plan solves the subproblem:
U (I (n)) = max
C=[c0;cT ]
U(C) subject to I(n)  R T0 e rtctdt: (27)
Once U (I (n)) is solved for, the parental problem can be recasted as one of choosing only the
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number of o¤springs:
V = max
n2[0;N ]
G(U (I (n)) ; V 0; D; n) (28)
where the optimality condition is given by

 @I
@n

 @U

@I
=MRSn;U : (29)
We now consider the solution to this problem using specic non-separable functional forms for
U and G. In particular, we illustrate the predictions of our fertility framework by analyzing the
cases of Example 3 and Example 5.
4.1 NCRRA preferences
Consider rst the preferences described in Example 3 with U given by (21) and G given by (22).
The following lemma characterizes U(I) for this case.
Lemma 2: U* for U=NCRRA. Let U be given by (21). Then
U(I) = 2I + U = 2 (wL(n) + Y   n) + U
where
2 =

r   (r   ) =
1  e((r )= r)T
 
1  e((r )(1 ) )T
  (r   ) (1  )
! 1
1 
> 0:
Notice from Lemma 2 that the non-separable CRRA specication implies that the marginal
utility of income is a constant independent of income, 2. Using Lemma 2 and the characterization
of the MRSn;U given in Example 3 for (22), equation (29) can be written in steady state as:
 
  wL0(n)2 = 0(n)
1  (n)U
 1  (eU=U)1 
1   (30)
where the left-hand-side represents the marginal cost of children, while the right-hand-side is the
marginal benet. Notice that in the non-separable CRRA case the marginal cost of children clearly
increases with wages. This increase is linear if  = 0 and asymptotically linear otherwise. As for
the marginal benet, it also increases with wages because U is a function of wages. Whether the
marginal benet increases linearly or not with wages, even asymptotically, depends critically on
. The following two propositions state the main results regarding fertility choices under NCRRA
preferences. Proposition 4 states that if  > 1 or EGS < 1 then the number of children approaches
N for w su¢ ciently large. This result is problematic because the evidence indicates that fertility
decreases with income. Proposition 5 characterizes the requirements for a negative fertility-income
relationship for any wage w:
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Proposition 4. Suppose U is dened by (21), G is dened by (22) and let w !1. Then n ! N
if  > 1 and n ! en if 0 <  < 1 where en solves the equation:
 L0(en)2 = 0(en)
1  (en)L(en) 11   : (31)
Proof. Equation (30) can be written as
 
=w   L0(n)2 = 0(n)
1  (n)
U
w
1  (eU=U)1 
1   :
Let w ! 1. Then =w ! 0, U=w ! L(n) and eU=U ! 0. For the case 0 <  < 1 the
previous equation becomes (31) for large w. For the case  > 1 the right-hand-side of the
previous expression, which is the marginal benet of children divided by w, diverges to +1
leading to maximum number of children.
The intuition for the results in Proposition 4 is interesting. Referring back to equation (29),
under NCRRA preferences the marginal utility of income is constant and the marginal costs of
children increases with wages. The reason why n ! N if  > 1 occurs because the marginal
benet of children increases too fast with wages. In other words, when  > 1 the utility gain of the
born child, U   eU , becomes too valuable for the parent when w ! 1. Notice that if  > 1 then
the EGS is low (EGS < 1). In this case, if wages go to innity, parents drive their consumption to
innite as part of the optimal plan. Moreover, the low elasticity of substitution between childrens
and parental consumption induces the parent to provide an increasing consumption to their children.
More importantly, providing consumption to a new child becomes increasingly more valuable than
rising consumption of existing family members. For this reason, parents facing a very large wage
would like to have as many children as possible if EGS < 1.
Next, Proposition 5 characterizes the requirements for @n=@w to be negative for any w. As the
proposition indicates, the negative fertility-income relationship can be obtained when 0 <  < 1
and 2Y + U > 0. It could also be obtained for  > 1 but when  < 1 +
2Y+U
2wL
. Notice that this
upper bound decreases with w and becomes 1 as w !1.
Proposition 5. Suppose U is dened by (21) and G is dened by (22). Then @n

@w < 0 if  = 0;eU ' 0 and 2Y+U2wL >    1:
Proof. Equation (30) can be written as
ln
 
  wL0(n)+ ln2 = ln+ ln0(n)  ln (1  (n)) +  lnU + ln U1    eU1 
1   :
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Di¤erentiating around the steady state yields:
 L0dw   wL00dn
  wL0 =

00
0
+
0
1  

dn +

U
@U
@I
dI +
1  
U1    eU1 U  @U

@I
dI
=

00
0
+
0
1  

dn +	
2
U
  
wL0    dn + Ldw
where
	 =  +
1  
1  (eU=U)1  = 1  (eU=U
)1 
1  (eU=U)1  > 0:
Collecting terms:
 

wL0
  wL0 +	22
wL
U

dw=w =

00
0
+
0
1   +
wL00
  wL0 +	22
wL0   
U

dn:
Next, notice that (30) can be written as 
0
1  =
2( wL0)
U [	  ] : Replacing this result into
the previous equation and simplifying:
 

L0
  wL0 +	2
L
U

dw =

00
0
  2  wL
0
U
+
wL00
  wL0

dn
or
dn
dw
=
L0
 wL0 +	2
L
U
 000 + 2( wL
0)
U   wL
00
 wL0
Provided that L00 < 0, or even if L00 > 0 but small, the denominator of this expression is
always positive. Therefore, dn=dw < 0 if and only if
wL0
  wL0 +
 
 +
1
1
1    11  (eU=U)1 
!
2
wL
U
< 0
Notice that the rst component is negative number between  1 and 0, while the second
component is positive for any  > 0 given that eU < U. The condition has best chances to
be satised when  = eU = 0 because the negative component is as large as possible ( 1)
and the positive component is as small as possible. If  = eU = 0 and 0 <  < 1, the
previous condition becomes 1 > 2wLU =
2wL
2(wL(n)+Y )+U or 2Y + U > 0: If  =
eU = 0 and
1 < ; the expression above becomes 1 > 2wLU = 
2wL
2(wL(n)+Y )+U = 
1
1+(2Y+U)=2wL
or
2Y+U
2wL
>    1:
Proposition 5 is one of the main results of this paper. It states that regardless of the EIS, it
is possible to obtain a negative fertility-income relationship in a dynamic model of altruism with
binding non-negative bequest constraints, as long as either Y > 0 or U > 0 and EGS > 1. Recall
from the discussion in Section 2 that in the case of separable utility, and provided that either
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Y > 0 or U > 0, a negative fertility-income relationship could only be obtained when EIS > 1.
The contribution here is that we have obtained a non-separable specication for which EIS < 1
can be assumed, as in most quantitative macro, but a negative fertility-income relationship still
holds. In this case, restrictions are placed on the EGS. This elasticity is a new concept and has
never been estimated. What our analysis suggests is that  < 1 would be consistent with fertility
and income data. We leave the estimation of  for future work.
Notice that the main result in Proposition 5 requires either Y > 0 or U > 0. But this may not
be a necessary condition in the context of other functional forms for U and G, as we now turn to
analyze.
4.2 NCARA-NCRRA preferences
Consider next the preferences in Example 5, which combine a CARA specication for U with a
CRRA specication for G. In particular, U is given by (23) and G is given by (22). The following
lemma characterizes U for this case.
Lemma 3: U* for U=NCARA. Let U be given by (23), r <  and I  1
r2
 r

 
rT + e rT   1.
Then,
U(I) = 3I +A+ U
where 3 = r1 e rT and
A  1


  r
r
1  e rT (1 + rT )
1  e rT

  ln


r
1  e rT
1  e T

> 0:
Notice that the resulting indirect utility U(I) is very similar to the one in Lemma 2, except
for the presence of a new constant A > 0 and a restriction for I to be above a certain level. This
restriction is required to avoid zero consumption in some periods which may occur because CARA
preferences do not satisfy Inada conditions. Given the similarity with the previous section, the
following two propositions follow.
Proposition 6. Suppose U is dened by (23), G is dened by (22) and let w !1: Then n ! N
if  > 1 and n ! en if 0 <  < 1 where en solves the equation:
 L0(en)3 = 0(en)
1  (en)L(en) 11   :
Proposition 7. Suppose U is dened by (23) and G is dened by (22). Then @n

@w < 0 if  = 0;eU ' 0 and 3Y+A+U3wL >    1:
The novel aspect of Proposition 7 is that it states that @n=@w can be negative even if Y =
U = 0. The fact that r <  and the form of consumption smoothing by individuals with CARA
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preferences induces a gain analogous to the presence of non-labor income, or non-economic goods.
Proposition 7 illustrates the exibility of our proposed framework in generating a negative fertility-
income relationship in a fully dynamic altruistic model.
5 Concluding comments
As Jones, Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2008) conclude, "....expanding the successful [fertility] models
to fully dynamic versions based on parental altruism is very challenging. Dynamic models are very
important for understanding the connection between cross-sectional fertility di¤erences and the
demographic transition. More research in this area is needed" (p.60). Our paper contributes to this
e¤ort. The distinguishing feature of our framework is that it provides a well microfounded class of
dynamic altruistic preferences that can be used to analyze fertility choice problems without imposing
restrictions on key parameters such as the EIS. Static models where the time-cost of children is the
main determinant of fertility require restrictions on the income elasticity of demand for children to
generate a negative fertility-income relationship. Almost all existing dynamic altruistic models of
fertility, starting from BB all the way to Manuelli and Seshadri (2009), need to assume EIS > 1 in
order to obtain a well-dened fertility choice problem. However, most quantitative macroeconomic
models assume EIS < 1. Our framework resolves these conicting scenarios by disentangling
the EIS from the EGS. This disentangle captures a dimension of intergenerational consumption
allocation that had not been singled out before.
The concept of an EGS that di¤ers from the EIS is new. As it is standard, an altruistic parent
with time-separable utility places a weight on the utility level of his children, but the rate at which
parental and children consumption is substituted is no di¤erent that the rate at which parental
consumption is substituted across time. Our non-separable dynamic altruistic framework allows to
capture an additional dimension of family decision making: the "curvature" that governs the rate
at which parents substitute own consumption and children consumption. We think this additional
dimension is of relevance, not only if fertility choice problems, but to study a number of problems
in family economics.
Our non-separable dynamic model of parental altruism may be useful to tackle and revisit a
number of other interesting issues in macroeconomics, in particular those that involve allocation
of resources among parents and children. It is undeniable that from the individuals point of view,
the basic unit where many important economic decisions are made is the family. These decisions,
such as consumption, saving, number of children, schooling and parental transfers to each of the
children, usually have long lasting impact in future economic outcomes of the family members. The
use of well-microfounded dynamic models of parental altruism may provide useful results that are
informative for policy makers in inuencing the choices made by the family unit. Examples of the
questions that could be analyzed with these tools include scal and distributional issues.
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A Children as longevity
The idea that altruistic parents need to consider the utility of children in the unborn state, D, may
seem counterintuitive. It also raises the question of how to identify this parameter (or the utility
ow of the unborn, eU) in applied work. An alternative way to derive preferences for children by
altruistic parents that sheds lights on both issues is to dene purely altruistic parents as individuals
who regard children as no more or no less than themselves, as an extension of their own life. If
so, then fertility decisions are analogous to longevity decisions. Since preferences for longevity are
better understood, one can use this equivalence to derive preferences for children.
To formalize this idea, consider an individual, Mary, who lives for up to two days, consuming
during the day and sleeping during the night. Mary lives and consumes for sure during the rst
day. For the second day, Mary has two options, a longevity and fertility option. The longevity
option is the following. By investing x resources during the rst day, Mary can buy a probability
p(x) of awakening, or living, for a second day. With probability 1   p(x) Mary does not awake,
or dies. Dying is painless because it is just remaining asleep during the second day. To be more
specic, suppose Marys welfare under this longevity option is described by
V a(c1; c2; x) = u(c1) + p(x)u(c2) + (1  p(x))u(0); (32)
where ct is day t consumption and u is a standard concave utility function. Notice that the proper
description of Marys welfare includes the term u(0), the utility in the event of not awakening for
a second day, or the utility in the death state. Such utility is relevant when deciding x.
The second option, the fertility option, is the following. Mary has no chances of awakening for
a second day. Instead, by investing x resources during the rst day, Mary can buy a probability
p(x) of creating a new individual, Sophia, Marys child. If born, Sophia will only live for day 2, will
have no children, and will enjoy consumption just as much as Mary does (u is the same for Mary
and Sophia). Sophia is in every aspect a replica of Mary in the second day.11 Let V b(c1; c2; x) be
Marys welfare in the second option where c1 is Marys consumption in day 1 and c2 is Sophias
consumption in day 2.
Whether Mary is altruistic toward Sophia or not depends on how V b(c1; c2; x) compares to
V a(c1; c2; x): For example, V b(c1; c2; x) > V a(c1; c2; x) for all (c1; c2; x) describes a particularly
strong degree of altruism toward Sophia while V b(c1; c2; x) < V a(c1; c2; x) describes a weaker degree
of altruism. The borderline case of V b(c1; c2; x) = V a(c1; c2; x) describes a situation in which the
parent values her child just as much as she values herself. We call this situation pure altruism.
According to this denition, a pure altruistic individual will not care whether she or her child is
the one who lives during the second day. This denition of altruism immediately implies that (32)
also represents Marys purely altruistic preferences in the fertility problem but with c2 representing
Sophias consumption instead of Marys. This result could also be derived from introspection.
Suppose Marys only option is option 2 and her preferences are described by V b(c1; c2; x): To see
if V b(c1; c2; x) is purely altruistic or not, Mary can wonder what her welfare would be if she could
take Sophias place and live one more day with probability x. Using this introspection procedure
Mary arrives to (32). Pure altruism results if V a(c1; c2; x) = V b(c1; c2; x) for all (c1; c2; x):
The equivalence between the longevity and fertility problem for a pure altruistic parent means
also that the utility of the unborn child is u(0), that is, the utility of the parent in the death state.
This follows because in the formulation above all utility comes from consumption, and being death
or unborn both entail zero consumption. While it is well-accepted that the utility in the death
state must be explicitly considered in models of endogenous longevity, it is not standard, and it is
even controversial, that the utility of children in the unborn state must also be considered. The
11Thus, for example, the fact that Mary would be two days old while Sophia would be one day old plays no role.
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previous derivation shows that such value arises naturally in altruistic models of fertility. Finally,
a typical normalization in longevity models is to set the value of death to zero. The analogy
between longevity and fertility implies that in that case the value of the unborn child should also
be normalized to zero.
To develop some further implications, suppose that
p(x) =

0 if x < x
1 if x  x ; (33)
and
c1 + c2 + x =W; (34)
whereW is amount of resources available to the parent. In this formulation p(x) can be interpreted
as the number of children, which is either 0 or 1, and x is the cost of raising a child. The parents
problem is to maximize (32) subject to (33) and (34). The solution to the problem is:
x = x; p = 1 and c1 = c2 = (W   x)=2 if 2u((W   x)=2)  u(W ) + u(0)
x = 0; p = 0, c1 =W and c2 = 0 otherwise.
Thus, the child is born if x and u(0) are not "too" high. Moreover, the solution depends on the
utility of the child if unborn, u(0); but the sign of u(:) plays no role.
We now discuss the formulation proposed by Alvarez (1999), Barro and Sala-i-Marti (2004),
and Jones and Schoonbroodt (2010) in the context of the example above. They specify the welfare
of the parent as
V b(c1; c2; x) = u(c1) + p(x)u(c2): (35)
In this formulation, the utility of the child if unborn is not explicitly considered. Jones and
Schoonbroodt (2009), recognizing this assumption, refer to this specication as one of partial altru-
ism. Both specications are equivalent when u(0) = 0 which also means that u(c)  0 is required.
Di¤erences arise when when u(c) is negative and therefore u(0) < 0. This is the case, for example,
when u(c) is of the CARA form or the CRRA form with elasticity below one.
To highlight the consequences of assuming (35) rather than (32) suppose that u(c) < 0. In that
case, reducing p(x) increases welfare because it reduces the negative e¤ect of an additional period
of negative utility ow. If p(x) is increasing in x, as in (33), then x = 0 will always be optimal
meaning that having no children will be optimal. To avoid this issue Alvarez (1999), Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (2004) and Jones and Schoonbroodt (2010) propose assuming that p(x) decreases
rather than increases with x.12 Such assumption implies that x = 0 is not necessarily optimal
anymore. For example, suppose that
p(x) =

1 if x < x
0 if x  x : (36)
In this case x is the cost of child prevention. It is easy to check that the solution is:
x = x; p = 0; c1 =W   x and c2 = 0 if u(W   x)  2u(W=2)
x = 0; p = 1, c1 = c2 =W=2 otherwise.
12Specically, their formulation is of the type
V b(c1; c2; x) = u(c1) + (n)u(c2);
where n is the number of children. They propose to assume 0(n) < 0 if u(c) < 0. Moreover, in their formulation
x = bn where b is the cost of raising a child, a parameter. Therefore, their proposal implies that  decreases with x
when u < 0.
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so the child is born if x is high enough.
Although assuming that p(x) decreases with x solves the technical problem of making interior
solutions possible, the problem has an unsettling interpretation. Consider rst the scenario in
which p(x) is a survival probability. In that case, the individual still prefers lower p(x) meaning
lower survival probability but dying is costly. In other words, the model becomes a model of pain
which the individual would like to end life but dying is costly. Such model may certainly describe
very dire situations of depression and/or painful illness but not the typical situation of life as a joy.
Consider next the second scenario in which p(x) is the number of children (either 0 or 1). In that
case, children inict a pain to the parent and she would prefer to have no children but controlling
fertility is costly. The model is more a model of "pests" control rather than a model of altruistic
fertility.
B Proofs
B.1 Example 3
To see that EGS = 1= in the non-separable CRRA case (NCRRA), notice that @U=@cv =
e v (U   U) c v ; GU (U; ::) = V U  and GV (U; ::) =  (1  e n)V V 0 . Denote bU = U   U:
Therefore,
MRS
 
cv; c
0
s

=
GU (U; :::)
GV (U; ::)GU (U 0; ::) 
@U=@cv
@U 0=@c0s
=
V U 
 (1  e n)V V 0   V 0U 0  
@U=@cv
@U 0=@c0s
=
U 
 (1  e n)U 0  
@U=@cv
@U 0=@c0s
=
U  bUc v e (v s0)
 (1  e n)U 0  bU 0c0 s :
Since bU is constant returns to scale, it can be written as bU = cv bUv where bUv is homogeneous of
degree zero. Therefore,
MRS
 
cv; c
0
s

=
bUv e (v s0)
 (1  e n) bU 0s 

U
U 0
 
=
bUv e (v s0)
 (1  e n) bU 0s 
 bUcU 0
!   
1 + U=bU
1 + U=cU 0
! 
=
bU v e (v s0)
 (1  e n)cU 0 s
 
1 + U=bU
1 + U=cU 0
! 


cv
c0s
 
so that
EGS
 
cv; c
0
s

=
d ln(c0s=cv)
d ln(MRS (cv; c0s))
' 1

if U=bU  0:
Specically, the EGS measures the percentage change in c0s=cv due to one percent change in
MRS (cv; c
0
s) holding constant all other consumption ratios.
B.2 Example 4
To see that the semi-elasticity of intertemporal substitution is SEIS = 1=U in the non-separable
CARA case (GCARA), notice that @U=@cv = e U (cv U+AU ) v where AU = U   1U ln
h

1 e T
i
.
Therefore, MRS (cv; cs) =
@U=@cv
@U=@cs
= e (v s)e U (cv cs) and SEIS = d ln(cs cv)d ln(MRS(cv ;cs)) = 1=U .
Thus, the SEIS measures the change in cs   cv due to one percent change in MRS (cv; cs). To see
that the intergenerational semi-elasticity SEGS = 1=G, notice that GU (U; ::) = e
 G(U V+AG)
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and GV (U; ::) =  (1  e n) e G(V 0 V+AG) where AG = 1G ln

1 + e F
 
1  e N. Therefore,
MRS
 
cv; c
0
s

=
GU (U; :::)
GV (U; ::)GU (U 0; ::) 
@U=@cv
@U 0=@c0s
=
e G(U V+AG)
 (1  e n) e G(V 0 V+AG)e G(U 0 V 0+AG)+AG 
e U (cv U+AU ) v
e
 U (c0s U 0+AU ) s0
s
=
e (G U )(U U 0)
 (1  e n) e GAG  e
 U (cv c0s) (v s0)
On the other hand,
U   U 0 =   1
U
ln

e ucv
R T
0 e
 te u(ct cv)dt

+
1
U
ln

e uc
0
s
R T
0 e
 te u(c
0
t c0s)dt

= cv   c0s +M
where
M =   1
U
ln
R T
0 e
 te u(ct cv)dt

+
1
U
ln
R T
0 e
 te u(ct cv)dt

:
Using this result into the expression for MRS results in
MRS
 
cv; c
0
s

=
e GM
 (1  e n) e GAG e
 (v s0)e G(cv c
0
s)
so that
SEGS =
d ln(c0s   cv)
d ln(MRS (cv; c0s))
= 1=G
where SEGS measures the change in c0s   cv due to one percent change in MRS (cv; c0s) holding
constant all other consumption di¤erences.
B.3 Example 5
To see that EGS  1= for large consumptions, notice that
U = cv   1
U
ln
R T
0 e
 te U (ct cv)dt

+AU = cv +Mv
where
Mv =   1
U
ln
R T
0 e
 te U (ct cv)dt

+
1
U
ln

1  e T


+ U:
Therefore,
MRS
 
cv; c
0
s

=
U 
 (1  e n)U 0  
@U=@cv
@U 0=@c0s
=
U 
 (1  e n)U 0  
e U (cv U+AU ) v
e U (c0s U 0+AU ) s
=
U eU (U U 0)
 (1  e n)U 0  e
 U (cv c0s) (v s) =
U eU (cv c0s+Mv M 0s)
 (1  e n)U 0  e
 U (cv c0s) (v s)
=
eU (Mv M 0s) (U=U 0) 
 (1  e n) e
 (v s) =
eU (Mv M 0s)e (v s)
 (1  e n)

cv +Mv
c0s +M 0s
 
:
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where notice that for large consumptions
MRS
 
cv; c
0
s
 ' eU (Mv M 0s)e (v s)
 (1  e n)

cv
c0s
 
case in which EGS ' 1=:
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